Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and WittgensteinABSTRACT Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability measuring stick of mental or lingual meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and temperament of the Others experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embrace behavioristic psychology and eliminate the belief of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each persons being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be pitying is to be hard-wired to make soul of the Other without having to verify the Others private sensations. I suggest that being-w ith emerged from an evolutionary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize each former(a) and to array their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, the like a cry of pain, functions to overprotect the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. IntroductionThere are obvious and important ways in which analytic and Continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us overlook their thematic and historical similarities. Both traditions had their roots in phenomenalistic theories that attempte d to reduce all meaning to the immediately given. Even though phenomenology was more generous in construing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor logical positivism could do justice to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in unique but complementary ways.Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasized linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical exemplify asserted that a synthetic sentence is meaningful for a person only if that person could use experience to sight the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more interested in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only through acts of verification.Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein Philosophy Philosophical PapersHusserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and WittgensteinABSTRACT Ph enomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Others experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each persons being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be human is to be hard-wired to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Others private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, like a cry of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. IntroductionThere are obvious and important ways in which analytic and continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us overlook their thematic and historical similarities. Both traditions had their roots in phenomenalistic theories that attempted to reduce all meaning to the immediately given. Even though phenomenology was more generous in co nstruing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor logical positivism could do justice to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in unique but complementary ways.Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasized linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical stage asserted that a synthetic sentence is meaningful for a person only if that person could use experience to discover the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more interested in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only through acts of verification.